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TORTS-JOINT TORTFEASORS-RELEASE IN FAVOR OF JOINT
TORTFEASOR WHO FILES PETITION IN BANKRUPTCY BEFORE PAYING
AGREED SETTLEMENT WILL BE APPLIED AS PRO RATA
REDUCTION OF PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT AGAINST
NONSETTLING JOINT TORTFEASORS
Rocco v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1985)
Under the Pennsylvania Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act (Joint Tortfeasors Act),1 a plaintiff's settlement agreement and re-
lease of one joint tortfeasor 2 reduces the plaintiff's recovery against the
nonsettling joint tortfeasors.3 When a released joint tortfeasor defaults
1. 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 8321-8327 (Purdon 1982). By adoption of
the Joint Tortfeasors Act in 1951, Pennsylvania abolished the common law rule
that prohibited contribution among joint tortfeasors when one had discharged
the claim of the injured plaintiff. Act ofJuly 19, 1951, Pub. L. No. 1130 § 8. For
a discussion of the Joint Tortfeasors Act, see Note, An Analysis of the Pennsylvania
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1951, 13 U. PITr. L. REV. 390 (1952).
For a discussion of the common law rule against contribution, see W. PROSSER &
R. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 50, at 336 (5th ed.
1984). For a discussion of the policies underlying contribution, see Gregory,
Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 365 (propos-
ing contribution among tortfeasors as an adequate and just system of loss distri-
bution governing liability in tort).
2. The Joint Tortfeasors Act defines 'joint tortfeasors" as "two or more
persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to persons or prop-
erty, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them."
42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8322 (Purdon 1982).
3. Joint Tortfeasors Act, 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 8331-8327 (Purdon
1982). Section 8326 provides:
A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before
or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the
release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors
in the amount of the consideration paid for the release or in any
amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim
shall be reduced if greater than the consideration paid.
Id. § 8326.
The enactment of § 8326 of the Joint Tortfeasors Act abolished the original
English rule that a release of one joint tortfeasor discharged all others liable to
the same plaintiff for the same harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 885 comment b (1979). The original rule developed at a time when the only
tortfeasors who could be joined in one action were those who had acted in con-
cert, so that the act of one became the act of the other. Id. This single cause of
action was indivisible and was completely surrendered or satisfied by a release of
any one tortfeasor. Id.
A frequent consequence of this rule was the unintentional discharge of one
or more of the tortfeasors. Id. The rule compelled a plaintiff "to forego any
opportunity of obtaining what it is possible to get from one defendant without
suit, or to give up the entire claim against the other without full compensation."
W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra note 1, § 49, at 333; see also Brown v. City of
Pittsburgh, 409 Pa. 357, 361, 186 A.2d 399, 402 (1962) (at common law, the
(1269)
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on such an agreement, Pennsylvania law generally allows the plaintiff the
option of suing to enforce the breached settlement or of suing on the
original cause of action. 4 If a settling joint tortfeasor's bankruptcy 5 oc-
release of one joint tortfeasor discharged the other and barred any future claim
against him (citing Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959)); Wilbert
v. Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., 385 Pa. 149, 151, 122 A.2d 406, 408
(1956) (under common law, release of one person bars actions against another
only if both were jointly liable); Koller v. Pennsylvania R.R., 351 Pa. 60, 63, 40
A.2d 89, 90 (1944) (release of one wrongdoer operates as release of all, since
there can be but one satisfaction for same injury); Mason v. C. Lewis Lavine,
Inc., 302 Pa. 472, 153 A. 754 (1931) (guest's release of driver of auto in which
she was riding also released driver of truck that collided with car because both
drivers were joint tortfeasors).
One device used to avoid the inequity of the common law rule was the cove-
nant not to sue in which a plaintiff merely agreed that he would not enforce his
cause of action against one tortfeasor. W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra note 1,
§ 49, at 334. Used as an obvious subterfuge to avoid the common law rule that
the release of one tortfeasor releases all, the covenant not to sue preserved a
plaintiff's claims against other tortfeasors, unless it was found that there had
been full satisfaction of his claims. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 885, comment b (1979). See generally Havighurst, The Effect of a Settlement with
One Co-Obligor Upon the Obligation of the Others, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1959). Courts,
however, were reluctant to recognize the different effects of a release and a cove-
nant not to sue, and they often continued to disallow recovery against a joint
tortfeasor by a plaintiff who had executed a covenant not to sue in favor of an-
other joint tortfeasor. See Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 72 F. Supp. 185,
187 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (under Pennsylvania law, covenant not to sue one of two
joint tortfeasors is bar to any subsequent recovery from another tortfeasor for
claim arising out of same cause of action), rev'd on other grounds, 167 F.2d 841
(3rd Cir. 1948); Smith v. Roydhouse Arey & Co., 244 Pa. 474, 90 A. 919 (1914)
(covenant not to sue one of two joint tortfeasors is a bar to any subsequent
recovery for claims arising out of same cause of action).
To the extent that the Joint Tortfeasors Act allows a plaintiff to recover
against nonsettling defendants after executing a release in favor of a settling
defendant, it effectively abolishes the distinction between a release and a cove-
nant not to sue. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 21-11,
at 772 n.4 (2d ed. 1977).
4. See Lucas v. Gibson, 341 Pa. 427, 19 A.2d 395 (1941); Schwartzfager v.
Pittsburgh, H.B. & N.C. Ry., 238 Pa. 158, 85 A. 1115 (1913); Zager v.
Gubernick, 205 Pa. Super. 168, 208 A.2d 45 (1965).
In Lucas, the plaintiff, a passenger in her son-in-law's automobile, was in-
jured in a collision with the defendant. Lucas, 341 Pa. at 428, 19 A.2d at 396.
While she was hospitalized, she executed a release presented to her by the de-
fendant's insurance agent whereby the insurance company agreed to pay her
medical bills as well as a separate settlement to her. Id. at 428-29, 19 A.2d at
396. The insurance company made the promised payments to the hospital, but
failed to pay the plaintiff. Id. at 430-31, 19 A.2d at 397. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that since the plaintiff had not received the agreed settlement,
she was justified in ignoring the release and suing in trespass on her original
cause of action for her injuries. Id. at 431, 19 A.2d at 397.
Similarly, in Schwartzfager, the plaintiff signed a release of his claims for per-
sonal injuries in favor of the defendant railroad company in exchange for the
company's agreement to pay his hospital bills and wages until he was able to
work. Schwartzfager, 238 Pa. at 162, 85 A. at 1116. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the company's subsequent failure to pay the plaintiff his prom-
ised wages was a failure of consideration for the release which justified the plain-
1270
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curs between the execution of a settlement agreement and the
tortfeasor's payment of the agreed sum to the plaintiff, either the plain-
tiff or the nonsettling joint tortfeasors must bear the risk of the bank-
rupt's inability to contribute to the plaintiff's recovery.6 In Rocco v.
tiff in disregarding it and bringing suit upon the original cause of action. Id. at
166, 85 A. at 1117.
In Zager, the plaintiff's claim for damages in an automobile accident was
settled with the defendant's insurance company, and a release in favor of the
company was executed. Zager, 205 Pa. Super. at 169, 208 A.2d at 47. The com-
pany later refused to pay the plaintiff the agreed settlement under the release,
asserting that its agent did not have the authority to bind the company in such a
release. Id. at 170, 208 A.2d at 47. In rejecting this defense, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court found that since the company had defaulted on the settlement,
the plaintiff was entitled either to enforce the agreement or to sue in trespass for
his damages from the accident. Id. at 173-74, 208 A.2d at 49.
Often, a court's determination that a plaintiff was justified in ignoring a re-
lease and suing on his underlying cause of action has been predicated on the
precise characterization of the release as an executory accord, rather than an
immediate discharge by the plaintiff of all claims against the defendant. See J.
MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 253, at 513 (1974) (discussing judicial divi-
sion of agreements into "accord and satisfactions" or "substituted contracts");
Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 504 (1964) (discussing distinction between executory ac-
cords and substituted contracts).
5. A filing in bankruptcy is brought pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (the Bankruptcy
Code). In enacting the Bankruptcy Code, the House indicated that the Code
"enunciates a bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh start" for the debtor. H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6087. The "fresh start" doctrine of bankruptcy law has been given
support by the Supreme Court. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244
(1934) (purpose of bankruptcy is to "relieve the honest debtor from the weight
of oppressive indebtedness" and to permit him "new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressures and discouragement of
preexisting debt") (quoting Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236
U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)); Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236
U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915) (emphasizing need to permit debtors to "start afresh"
after bankruptcy). See also Comment, Protection of a Debtor's "Fresh Start" Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 29 CATH. L. REV. 843 (1980) (Bankruptcy Code's primary
focus is to enable debtors to maintain their independent economic existences
after bankruptcy).
6. It is noted that if the plaintiff bears this risk and sues to enforce the set-
tlement agreement after a defendant files for bankruptcy, the plaintiff's action
will be stayed under the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For a discussion of the automatic stay pro-
vision, see infra note 15. Furthermore, as a nonpriority, unsecured creditor, the
plaintiff is unlikely to receive the full amount owed him by the defendant as a
result of the bankruptcy proceedings. For a discussion of unsecured creditor
recovery under the Bankruptcy Code, see infra note 15.
If the plaintiff is entitled to ignore the release and maintain his original
cause of action, the nonsettling joint tortfeasors will bear the risk of the settling
tortfeasor's bankruptcy. See Rocco v.Johns-Manville Corp., 754 F.2d 110, 116-
17 (3d Cir. 1985). Because joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, the
plaintiffs could proceed against the nonsettling tortfeasors for the settling
tortfeasor's share of liability. See W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra note 1, § 47, at
327 and infra note 30 and accompanying text. The nonsettling tortfeasors could
thereafter seek contribution from the settling tortfeasor under the Joint
3
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Johns-Manville Corp.,7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit decided that when a plaintiff releases a joint tortfeasor who sub-
sequently files for bankruptcy before paying the agreed settlement, the
plaintiff will bear this risk and the court will apply the release to reduce
the plaintiff's judgment against the nonsettling joint tortfeasors. 8
Tortfeasors Act to the extent of its pro rata share. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8324 (Purdon 1982) (right of contribution among joint tortfeasors). The
treatment in bankruptcy of such a claim for contribution against a settling
tortfeasor, however, is not without ambiguity. The Third Circuit, in In re M.
Frenville Co., 744 F. 2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub. nom., Frenville Co. v.
Avellino & Bienes, 105 S. Ct. 911 (1985), held that while the acts of the debtor
which formed the basis of a contribution claim occurred before the filing of the
debtor's bankruptcy petition, the cause of action itself for contribution did not
arise until after the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 744 F.2d at 337. Since the
automatic stay applies only to proceedings that could have been commenced or
claims that arise before the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the Third Circuit held
it inapplicable to post-petition contribution claims. Id.
A number of courts, however, have disagreed with the Third Circuit's inter-
pretation of the applicability of the automatic stay to claims against a bankrupt
for contribution or indemnity. See, e.g., Paine Webber Group, Inc. v. Baldwin
United Corp. (In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litigation), 756 F. 2d 343, 348 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1985) (noting broad definition of "claim" in Bankruptcy Code and the un-
certainty as to whether automatic stay applies to third-party claims for contribu-
tion); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 57 Bankr. 759, 765 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985)
(expressing disagreement with Frenville as to broadness of term "claim" and re-
sulting applicability of automatic stay to actions for contribution and indemnity);
In re Yanks, 49 Bankr. 56, 58 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (rejecting Frenville approach and
noting that to treat claim for contribution as post-petition "would allow
tortfeasor to collect from the estate of his joint tortfeasor ahead of injured party,
which shares with other unsecured creditors at bottom of distribution chain.");
In re Baldwin-United Corp., 48 Bankr. 901, 903-04 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (de-
clining to follow Frenville by finding that right to payment in contribution from
the debtor arose before filing of debtor's bankruptcy petition and was thus sub-
ject to automatic stay).
Should a court elect to follow Frenville and hold that a claim for contribution
by the non-settling tortfeasors is a post-petition claim not arising until after the
filing of the settling tortfeasor's bankruptcy petition, such a claim would not be
subject to the automatic stay. Rather, it is submitted, the post-petition claim for
contribution would be treated as an administrative expense of the debtor's
tortfeasor's estate. Under the Bankruptcy Code, administrative expenses are
given a priority in payment over other unsecured, pre-petition claims. See 11
U.S.C. § 507 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (priorities). Thus, treatment of a claim for
contribution as an administrative expense rather than as a pre-petition claim
would result in a greater likelihood of payment to the non-settling tortfeasors
and the anomaly, as the bankruptcy court in In re Yanks suggested, of recovery by
a tortfeasor against his joint tortfeasor before any injured party. See In re Yanks,
48 Bankr. 56, 58 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
For a further discussion of the operation of the automatic stay, see infra note
15.
7. 754 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985).
8. Id. at 111, 117. The reduction of the plaintiff's judgment against the
nonsettling tortfeasors is made pursuant to the Joint Tortfeasors Act. 42 PA.
CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8326 (Purdon 1982). For the text of Section 8326, see
supra note 1. For a further discussion of the Joint Tortfeasors Act, see infra note
23 and accompanying text.
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The issue before the Third Circuit arose in a claim by a shipfitter,
John Rocco, and his wife against several manufacturers and suppliers of
asbestos products.9 Rocco contracted asbestosis' 0 as a result of his ex-
posure to asbestos products and dust while he was working at the New
York and Philadelphia Naval Shipyards."I The Roccos brought a diver-
sity action for damages on a theory of strict products liability for failure
to warn.
12
9. Rocco v.Johns-Manville Corp., No. 80-0608 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1982) (un-
published memorandum and order of Judge Louis J. Bechtle) (on file at the of-
fices of the Villanova Law Review).
The Rocco's complaint named 18 defendants: Johns-Manville Corp.; Johns-
Manville Sales Corp.; Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.; Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corp.; Owens-Illinois Glass Co.; Pittsburgh Coming Corp.; GAF Corp.; Celotex
Corp.; Unarco Industries; H.K. Porter Co.; Southern Asbestos Co.; Eagle-
Pitcher Industries; Amatex Corp.; Pacor, Inc.; Keene Corp.; Garlock, Inc.; Glen
Alden, Inc.; Rapid American Corp.. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 110. The following com-
panies were joined as third party defendants: Asten-Hill Manufacturing Co.;
Certain Teed Corp.; Forty-Eight Insulators, Inc.; Fibreboard Corp.; Nicolet In-
dustries. Id. Before trial, the plaintiffs' claims against Keene Corp. were severed
and assigned to another judge for disposition as a result ofjudicial disqualifica-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(ii) (Supp. V 1982) (judicial disqualification
when any justice, judge, or magistrate or his spouse, or person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them, or spouse of such person is acting as
lawyer in proceeding). Rocco, 754 F.2d at 112 n.1.
10. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 112. Asbestosis, the earliest known and most com-
mon asbestos-related disease, is generally found only among workers employed
regularly and continuously with asbestos. I. SELIKOFr & D. LEE, ASBESTOS AND
DISEASE (1978). A latent disease, asbestosis manifests itself 10 to 40 years after
exposure to significant quantities of asbestos. Id. Inhalation of asbestos fibers
initiates an inflammatory process that replaces functioning lung tissue with
scarred tissue. Id. This process destroys the air sacs in the lung tissue, prevent-
ing the lung from diffusing oxygenated blood to the arteries and preventing car-
bon dioxide from being released. Id. The result is a decrease in pulmonary
function and lung volume. Id. Symptoms associated with asbestosis includes
shortness of breath, coughing, chest pains, and clubbing of the fingers. Id.
While the disease is not always fatal, it is progressive and incurable, and in-
creases the victim's risk of lung cancer. Id.; see also Special Project An Analysis of
the Legal, Social and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573,
579 n.10 (1983) (discussing etiology and symptoms of asbestosis).
11. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 112. Rocco was employed at the New York Shipyard
and the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard from 1943 to 1981. Id.
12. Id. at 112. The plaintiffs' action was brought under § 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts comment k (unavoidably unsafe products). Section
402A provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
5
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During the trial, the plaintiffs settled with a number of defend-
ants. 13 The plaintiffs also entered a settlement agreement in which one
of the defendants, Unarco Industries, Inc. (Unarco), promised to pay the
Roccos $15,000 in exchange for the Roccos' release. 14 Unarco, how-
ever, filed for corporate reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code) 1 5 after obtaining a
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1979). Comment k provides that
"[s]uch a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions
and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Id. comment k
(emphasis in original); see also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (landmark case imposing duty to warn on manufacturers
and suppliers of asbestos), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
13. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 111. The plaintiffs executed pro rata releases in
favor of the following defendants: Amatex Corp.; Asten-Hill Manufacturing Co.
Inc.; Forty-Eight Insulators, Inc.; GAF Corp.; Nicolet Industries; Owens-Illinois
Glass Corp.; Pacor, Inc.; Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.; Owens-Corning Fiberglass;
Celotex Corp.; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; Fibreboard Corp.; Garlock, Inc.;
H.K. Porter Co.; and Unarco Industries, Inc. Id. at 112-13 & 113 nn. 3-4.
14. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116. The release executed by plaintiffs in Unarco's
favor provided as follows:
It is further agreed and understood by the parties hereto, that any other
person or organization whom we claim is liable to us for our injuries,
losses and damages shall not be entitled to a satisfaction of reduction
or pro rata reduction or the damages we are claiming against them by
reason of the payment herein, unless it is adjudicated that Releasees are
Joint Tortfeasors with said person or organization. In the event that
Releasees are adjudicated to be Joint Tortfeasors than the payment herein
shall constitute a reduction to the extent of the pro rata share of liability of
Releasees for the damages recoverable by us from the other tortfeasors.
Rocco v.Johns-Manville Corp., et al., No. 80-0608 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 1982) (un-
published memorandum and order of Judge Louis J. Bechtle at 7) (emphasis
supplied by the court) (on file at offices of Villanova Law Review).
It is observed that the release provided that no reduction would be made in
plaintiffs' ultimate recovery against any other tortfeasor unless Unarco was adju-
dicated a joint tortfeasor. Moreover, if Unarco was adjudicated a tortfeasor, the
release provided and the Joint Tortfeasors Act provides that a pro rata reduction
would be made in the plaintiffs' recovery against the nonsettling tortfeasors. See,
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8326 (Purdon 1982). Such a pro rata reduction pro-
vision protects a settling defendant from a claim of contribution by a nonsettling
defendant in the event that the settling defendant is adjudicated a tortfeasor
because the settling defendant's pro rata share has been extinguished by the
release. See Id. § 8327.
15. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. III
1985). Chapter 11 reorganization is available to "persons," which is defined by
the Code to include individuals, partnerships and corporations. Id. §§ 109(d),
101 (30). The primary purpose of chapter 11 is to rehabilitate businesses so that
they can maintain employment levels, pay creditors, and produce a return for
their investors. A. COHEN, BANKRUPTCY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER
DEBTOR-CREDITOR MA'TrERS 14.501, at 265 (1981). The provisions in chap-
ters 1, 3 and 5 are applicable to cases filed under chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). The filing of a reorganization petition has the legal
effect of halting all judicial actions against the corporate debtor, including suits
brought in tort. Id. § 362(a)(1). The filing stays
6
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release executed by the Roccos but before paying them the agreed set-
tlement.1 6 The plaintiffs subsequently recovered verdicts against both
Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning. 17 In response to special inter-
rogatories,18 the jury found that Johns-Manville, Pittsburgh Corning,
Unarco, and five other settling defendants had proximately caused the
plaintiffs' injury.19
the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment of process, or a judicial, administrative, or other action or pro-
ceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case ... or to recover a claim against
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case....
11 U.S.C. 362(a) (Supp. III 1985).
While judgments cannot be recovered against a debtor in reorganization, a
claimant may petition to have the automatic stay modified to allow a case to be
tried up to the point of judgment to determine damages. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
In a reorganization under chapter 11, secured and unsecured claimants re-
ceive payment through a plan of rehabilitation. Id. §§ 1121, 1123. Under
§ 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor or his trustee must propose a plan to
pay off the corporate debts either with corporate assets or future earnings from
operations. Id. § 1123; see A. COHEN, supra, at 14-504.2-14-509. Creditors
whose claims are secured by a lien on the property of the bankrupt corporation
are secured creditors who enjoy the highest priority and are satisfied to the ex-
tent of their security interest before any unsecured creditor receives payment.
See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (determination of secured status).
Under the Bankruptcy Code unsecured creditors are general creditors who have
no security interest but are entitled to a "right to payment, whether or not such
right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured .... legal (or) equitable." Id. § 101(4)(A). Because a person
with a tort claim is classified as a non-priority, unsecured creditor, the tort claim-
ant is likely to receive less through a reorganization than through an independ-
ent tort suit. See id. § 502 (allowance of claims or interests); § 507 (priorities).
See also Comment, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Creditor System: Asbestos Times,
the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1984). A tort claimant who exercises a
release in favor of a bankrupt defendant would similarly be classified as a non-
priority, unsecured creditor because his claim against the debtor is based on the
contractual settlement. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 507 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
16. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116. The chapter 11 petition was filed three weeks
after the plaintiffs signed the release in Unarco's favor. Id. See In re UNR Indus.,
Inc., 29 Bankr. 741, 743 (N.D. Ill. 1983). UNR Industries, of which Unarco In-
dustries is a subsidiary, filed for chapter 11 reorganization on July 29, 1982. Id.
The company alleged that it was a defendant in some 17,000 asbestos-related
personal injury lawsuits with exposure to damages in the incalculable millions of
dollars. Id.
17. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 111. The verdict was entered against Johns-Manville
Corp.,Johns-Manville Sales Corp. and Pittsburgh Corning Corp. Id. at 113 n.5.
Rocco was awarded $500,000 in damages; his wife, Antoinette, was awarded
$50,000. Id. at 112. The parties to the appeal, as well as the court, treated
Johns-Manville Corp. and Johns-Manville Sales Corp. as one entity. Id. at 113
n.5.
18. 754 F.2d at 112. The special interrogatories were submitted in con-
junction with defendants Johns-Manville's and Pittsburgh Corning's cross-
claims. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b) (submission to jury of written interrogato-
ries accompanying forms for general verdict).
19. 754 F.2d at 112. Eight defendants were, therefore, adjudicated as joint
7
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The district court denied Johns-Manville's and Pittsburgh Corning's
post-trial motions for judgments non obstante verdicto (n.o.v.) and new
trial, 20 but in accordance with the Joint Tortfeasors Act,2 ' the district
tortfeasors: Johns-Manville; Pittsburgh Corning; and six of the settling defend-
ants (Unarco, Celotex Corp., Eagle-Picher Industries, Fibreboard Corp., Gar-
lock Inc., and H.K. Porter Co.). Id. at 113 & n.4. An additional defendant,
Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., was acknowledged to be a joint tortfeasor by
the terms of a release executed in its favor by the plaintiffs. Id. at 113. For a
further discussion of the significance of adjudication as a joint tortfeasor and of
the effect given Owens Corning's release by the district court and the Third
Circuit, see infra note 23 and accompanying text.
While a total of nine defendants were determined to be joint tortfeasors
either by jury adjudication or by the terms of their releases, the severing of the
plaintiffs' claim against Keene Corp. made it impossible for the Third Circuit to
fix the exact share of each defendant's liability. See 754 F.2d at 119. For a fur-
ther discussion of this problem, see supra note 9 and infra note 39 and accompa-
nying text. Should Keene Corp. ultimately be adjudged a joint tortfeasor, each
defendant's share of liability would be 1/10 rather than 1/9. For a further dis-
cussion of this calculation, see infra note 39. The determination of each defend-
ant's share of liability is necessary in order to reduce the plaintiffs' judgment
against the nonsettling defendants (Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning) by
any pro rata releases executed by the plaintiffs in favor of the settling defend-
ants. For a further discussion of the reduction of plaintiffs' judgment against
Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning, see infra notes 31-39 and accompanying
text.
20. 754 F.2d at 112. The defendants' motions were based on insufficiency
of the evidence and excessiveness of the verdicts. Id. The district court found
that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict and that the verdict
itself was not excessive. Id. at 113-14. In affirming the district court's decision,
the court of appeals noted that it must affirm the jury's damage award unless it is
"so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of the court." Id. at 114; see
Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 1981) (jury's damage award must
be affirmed unless so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1008 (1982); Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping, Inc. Cie Chambon Maclovia
S.A., 562 F.2d 215, 225-26 (3d Cir. 1977) (court of appeals may reverse determi-
nation of district judge and grant new trial only if verdict is so grossly excessive
as to shock judicial conscience), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
The plaintiffs filed motions for verdict nunc pro tunc and for judgment n.o.v.
on behalf of three defendants in whose favor the plaintiffs had executed pro rata
releases, asserting that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's find-
ing that these defendants had proximately caused plaintiffs' injury and, there-
fore, that they should not be adjudged joint tortfeasors. Memorandum and
order of Sept. 9, 1982, at 8-9. The plaintiffs made these motions to avoid a
reduction of the verdict in the event that the released defendants later were ad-
judged joint tortfeasors under the Joint Tortfeasors Act. 42 PA. CONST. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8321-8327 (Purdon 1982). For a discussion of the reduction made in a
plaintiff's verdict under the Joint Tortfeasors Act, see infra notes 31-39 and ac-
companying text.
The court found the plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict untimely, hav-
ing been submitted after the verdict was entered. Memorandum and order of
Sept. 9, 1982, at 7. The district court noted that the filing of a motion for a
directed verdict at the close of all the evidence was a prerequisite to considera-
tion of a motion for judgment n.o.v. Id. (citing Wall v. United States, 592 F.2d
154, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1979) (motion for judgment n.o.v. cannot be granted to
party who fails to move for directed verdict); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict). After the trial, the plaintiffs also
1276
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court granted in part Johns-Manville's and Pittsburgh Corning's motion
to mold the verdict in light of the releases executed by the plaintiffs.
22
The court made pro rata reductions in the plaintiffs' recovery for the
releases executed by the plaintiffs in favor of the settling defendants
whom the jury had adjudged as joint tortfeasors. 23 One such reduction
moved to add delay damages to the verdict, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Civil Procedure 238. Id. at 8; see PA. R. Civ. P. 238. The plaintiffs' motion for
delay damages was granted, but entry of the amounts due was reserved until the
court modified the verdicts in accordance with the Joint Tortfeasors Act. Memo-
randum and order of Sept. 9, 1982, at 10. For a discussion of plaintiff's verdict,
see infra note 31 and accompanying text. After reducing the verdicts by giving
effect to the various settlements, delay damages at 10% per year were computed
on plaintiffs' awards. Memorandum and order of Dec. 15, 1982, at 2-8.
21. 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8326 (Purdon 1982). For the text of
§ 8326, see supra note 3.
22. Memorandum and order of Dec. 15, 1982, at 3-8.
23. Id. at 7-8. The settling defendants who had received pro rata releases
and who were subsequently adjudged tortfeasors were Celotex Corp., Eagle-
Picher Industries, H.K. Porter Co., Unarco Industries. Id. at 6. Pro rata reduc-
tion of the plaintiffs' verdict was also made for a release executed in favor of
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. for consideration of $25,000. Id. at 5-6.
Under the Joint Tortfeasors Act, a defendant is not entitled to a reduction
of plaintiff's judgment against him, unless the settling defendant who executed
the release is ultimately adjudged a joint tortfeasor. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8326 (Purdon 1982). In order to establish his status as a joint tortfeasor, a
settling defendant may be required by a nonsettling defendant to remain in the
case through trial and verdict. See Slaughter v. Pennsylvania X-Ray Corp., 638
F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1981); Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348, 123 A.2d 422 (1956). Joint
liability may also be established in a separate contribution suit or from a prior
judicial determination. See Schwartz v. Sunderland, 402 Pa. 222, 169 A.2d 289
(1961) (action for contribution); Mazer v. Security Ins. Group, 507 F.2d 1338
(3d Cir. 1975) (en banc) (prior judicial determination).
In addition, the Third Circuit has held that a plaintiff can concede in a re-
lease that a settling defendant was a joint tortfeasor regardless of whether he
was in fact a joint tortfeasor. Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1072 (3d
Cir. 1974). Through such a "Griffin" release, a plaintiff agrees to a reduction,
whether pro rata or for consideration paid, of any subsequent judgment he may
receive against other joint tortfeasors. Id. While the release executed in Owens-
Corning Fiberglass' favor did not acknowledge Owens-Corning Fiberglass to be
a joint tortfeasor, counsel stipulated in advance of trial that the release should
be "treated as if it were a 'Griffin' release" and that the verdict should be reduced
pro rata whether or not the released party herein was in fact a joint tortfeasor.
754 F.2d at 115, n.6.
The district court also reduced the plaintiffs' verdict by the amounts paid
for releases given the following defendants: Amatex Corp.; Asten-Hill Manufac-
turing Co.; Forty-eight Insulations; GAF Corp.; Nicolet Industries; Owens-Illi-
nois Glass Corp.; Pacor, Inc.; and Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. Memorandum and
order of Dec. 15, 1982, at 3. These releasees provided that any other organiza-
tion claimed by the plaintiffs to be liable to them "shall not be entitled to a
satisfaction or reduction or pro rata reduction of the damages we are claiming
against them by reason of the judgment herein, unless it is adjudicated that
Releasees are Joint Tortfeasors with said person or organization." 754 F.2d at
115 n.6. Although these defendants were not adjudged joint tortfeasors, the
district court reduced the plaintiffs' verdict "on the basis of ... equity and fair-
ness .... to prevent an unjust enrichment." Memorandum and order of Dec.
9
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in the plaintiffs' judgment against Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corn-
ing was for the Roccos' release of Unarco, notwithstanding the fact that
Unarco had commenced bankruptcy proceedings and had not paid the
Roccos the agreed settlement. 24 The district court ruled that Unarco's
bankruptcy did not alter either its joint tortfeasor status or the rights of
Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning to pro rate reduction of the
judgment under the Joint Tortfeasors Act.2 5
On appeal to the Third Circuit,2 6 the plaintiffs argued that Unarco's
filing of a chapter 11 petition and its failure to pay the agreed considera-
tion for the Roccos' release constituted a breach of the settlement agree-
ment and, therefore, gave the plaintiffs the right to rescind 2 7 the
release. 2 8 The Roccos contended that, under Pennsylvania law, they
had the option of enforcing the release or of treating it as rescinded,
thereby retaining their original cause of action.29 By proceeding on
their original tort claim, the plaintiffs argued, they could recover
Unarco's pro rata share of the judgment from Johns-Manville and Pitts-
burgh Corning. 30
15, 1982, at 3-4. The Third Circuit stated that the amounts paid by these de-
fendants should not have been deducted from the verdicts "because as to them
there was no adjudication of liability nor had they executed joint tortfeasor
["Griffin"] releases." 754 F.2d at 115.
24. Memorandum and order of Dec. 15, 1982, at 7 n.5. For a discussion of
the propriety of this reduction under the circumstances, see infra notes 73-75
and accompanying text.
25. Memorandum and order of Dec. 15, 1982, at 7 n.5.
26. Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning both appealed the Sept. 9, 1982
district court order. 754 F.2d at 112. Johns-Manville's appeal was docketed at
No. 82-1624, but was stayed on April 27, 1983, following the company's filing of
a chapter 11 reorganization petition on August 26, 1982. 754 F.2d at 112 n.2;
see In reJohns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). Pittsburg
Corning's appeal of the Sept. 9, 1982 order was docketed at No. 82-1652, but
was dismissed for failure to prosecute. 754 F.2d at 112 n.2. The plaintiffs and
Pittsburgh Corning appealed the Dec. 15, 1982 district court order. Id. at 113.
The appeal was heard by Circuit CourtJudges Adams, Gibbons and Weis. Id. at
11. Judge Weis wrote the majority opinion. Id. Judge Gibbons filed a dissent-
ing opinion. Id. at 119.
27. 754 F.2d at 116. Both the plaintiffs and the court addressed the ability
of the plaintiffs to "rescind" the release. Id. As one authority has suggested:
"the word rescission should be relegated to a mutual agreement of discharge of
an executory bilateral contract. The term, however, shares the malady of other
legal terms which have been used in a variety of senses." J. MURRAY, supra note
4, § 252 at 510 n.41. The plaintiffs and the court undoubtedly intended "re-
scind" to mean the ability of the plaintiffs to ignore the release in the event of its
breach. See Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116. Such will be the use of the word in this
casebrief.
28. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116.
29. Id. For a further discussion of remedies in Pennsylvania for the breach
of a settlement agreement, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
30. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116. Since Unarco, Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh
Corning were all adjudicated joint tortfeasors, the plaintiffs could elect to pro-
ceed against Johns-Manville and/or Pittsburgh Corning on a theory of joint and
several liability if the release was rescinded. See W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra
1278 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1269
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Judge Weis, writing for a majority of the Third Circuit, rejected this
argument and held that, under Pennsylvania law, the Roccos' release of
Unarco would be applied to reduce their judgment against Johns-Manvi-
ille and Pittsburgh Corning. 3 1 Although the court acknowledged the
Pennsylvania rule that allows a plaintiff to rescind a breached settlement
agreement and to proceed under his original cause of action, the court
held that this rule is inapplicable when the filing of a chapter 11 reor-
ganization petition constitutes the alleged breach. 32 Moreover, the
court observed that the plaintiffs had cited no authority to support their
contention that the filing of a bankruptcy petition gave them the option
of voiding their release.3 3 The court observed that even if Unarco's re-
lease was construed as an executory contract, 34 the Bankruptcy Code
provides that entry into bankruptcy alone does not act as a breach of an
note 1, § 47, at 327; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text. Johns-
Manville's filing of its chapter 11 petition, however, would stay any legal action
commenced by the plaintiffs against it since, under the Bankruptcy Code, all
legal proceedings against a debtor are stayed once a bankruptcy petition is filed.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1984). For a discussion of the automatic stay
provision, see supra note 15. For a discussion of the same problem faced by the
plaintiffs in their attempt to enforce the releases against Unarco, see supra notes
15.
31. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116-17.
32. Id. at 116. The court suggested that had the breach occurred before
Unarco's bankruptcy intervened, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to re-
scind the release. Id. The court, however, did not discuss whether Unarco's
nonpayment of the promised consideration constituted a breach of the release
even before the bankruptcy proceedings were commenced. Id. For a further
discussion of the court's failure to consider non-payment as breach, see infra
notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
33. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116.
34. Id. at 116 n.7. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define "execu-
tory contract," the legislative history to § 365 explains that the term "generally
includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both
sides." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5920; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprinted in
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & AD. NEWS 5963. One scholar has defined an executory
contract as a "contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the
other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the perform-
ance of the other." Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57
MINN. L. REv. 439, 460 (1973). Professor Williston has commented that "all
contracts to a greater or less extent are executory. When they cease to be so,
they cease to be contracts." S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 14 at 28 (3d ed. 1957). Another authority has noted that the usual
release is not promissory in character but, rather, purports to be and is, an exe-
cuted transaction. J. MURRAY, supra note 4, § 260, at 526; see In re KMMCO, Inc.,
40 Bankr. 976 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (settlement agreement was not executory
where one party had performed her promise to release her rights).
The Third Circuit noted that the Roccos' release, having been signed by the
plaintiffs and the claims against Unarco having been dismissed, was not an exec-
utory contract. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116 n.7. Fora further discussion of the signif-
icance of the Third Circuit's determination that the Roccos' release was not an
executory contract, see infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
127919861
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executory contract.3 5 The court reasoned that because the filing of a
chapter 11 petition was not a breach by Unarco, the plaintiffs did not
have a right of rescission. 36 Furthermore, because the Roccos had not
taken steps to rescind the settlement agreement before Unarco's bank-
ruptcy intervened, 37 the majority found the plaintiffs to be in the same
35. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116 n.7 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982)). Section 365
of the Bankruptcy Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in
subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee ... may assume
or reject any executory contract....
(b)(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract ... the
trustee may not assume such contract ... unless, at the time of assump-
tion of such contract ... the trustee-
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will
promptly cure, such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee
will promptly compensate . . . for any actual pecuniary loss to such
party resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under
such contract....
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default
that is a breach of a provision relating to-
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time
before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; ....
(e)(1) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract ...
or in applicable law, an executory contract ... of the debtor may not be
terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such con-
tract . . . may not be terminated or modified, at any time after com-
mencement of the case solely because of a provision in such contract
... that is conditioned on-
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time
before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
36. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116-17.
37. Id. The court noted its dissatisfaction with the plaintiffs' legal course of
action, suggesting that the plaintiffs "at least should have applied to the bank-
ruptcy court for modification or rescission of their contract with Unarco." Id. at
117. The court of appeals decision indicates that the plaintiffs had not com-
menced separate action against Unarco in bankruptcy court at the time of their
judgment against Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning. Id. at 117. If the
Roccos had attempted rescission or enforcement of their settlement agreement
with Unarco, they would have brought such an action in the bankruptcy court,
because the bankruptcy courts, as adjuncts of the federal district courts, are
granted original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters and proceedings in
bankruptcy cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. III 1985) (bankruptcy judges shall
constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court); 28
U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. III 1985) (district court may provide that cases arising
under title 11 be referred to bankruptcy judges for the district, bankruptcy
judges thus empowered to hear cases and core proceedings arising under title
11); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. III 1985) (district court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction of all bankruptcy cases, and original but not exclusive jurisdiction of
all civil proceedings arising in or related to bankruptcy cases).
It is submitted, however, that the plaintiffs' failure to contest the release in
1280 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1269
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position as any other unsecured creditor forced to seek payment from a
bankrupt.3 8 Finally, the court noted that to allow the plaintiffs to re-
scind their release of Unarco would unduly prejudice Unarco's other
creditors because the result would be a contribution judgment in Johns-
Manville's and Pittsburgh Corning's favor for more than $50,000, in-
stead of Unarco's obligation to pay the plaintiffs $15,000 under the
release.
3 9
Dissenting from the court's decision, Judge Gibbons stated that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not, at the Roccos' expense, allow
Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning to escape the risk of Unarco's
insolvency. 40 Judge Gibbons acknowledged that Pennsylvania law pro-
bankruptcy court would not alone preclude the Third Circuit from reaching the
issue of the legal consequence of Unarco's bankruptcy on the release and, conse-
quently, plaintiffs' ability to disregard the release and proceed against Johns-
Manville and Pittsburgh Corning for Unarco's share of liability. The district
court's consideration of the effect of the plaintiffs' release of Unarco within the
context of the plaintiffs' suit against Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning
gave the Third Circuit jurisdiction to review this determination as a matter of
law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp. III 1985) (court of appeals with jurisdiction
over appeals from all final decisions of district courts); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FED-
ERAL COURTS § 101, at 697 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing review of district court
decisions by courts of appeals).
It is further submitted that the decision by the Third Circuit on the validity
of the release would have no collateral estoppel effect on Unarco because
Unarco was not a party to the Third Circuit's decision regarding this issue. See
id. § 100A at 682-85 (non-parties to action are not bound by previously litigated
issue in subsequent action); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS) § 27
(1982) (previously litigated issue essential to judgment is conclusive in subse-
quent action between parties).
38. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 117. For a discussion of the plaintiffs' status as an
unsecured creditor, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
39. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 117. In this action eight defendants were adjudicated
joint tortfeasors (i.e., Johns-Manville, Pittsburgh Corning, Unarco, Celotex
Corp., Eagle-Picher Industries, Fibreboard Corp., Garlock, Inc., H.K. Porter
Co.), and one was conceded a joint tortfeasor by the terms of its release (i.e.,
Owens Corning Fiberglass). Id. at 113. If the plaintiffs were allowed to rescind
their release, Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning, as the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors, would be forced to pay Unarco's 1/9 share of the judgment. Id. at
116. Because the district court awarded John Rocco $500,000 and his wife, An-
toinette, $50,000 in damages, this 1/9 share would be in excess of $50,000. Id.
The court noted, however, that the precise monetary judgment awarded the
plaintiffs against Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning could not be deter-
mined until the plaintiffs' claims against the severed defendant, Keene Corp.,
were adjudicated. Id. at 119. For a discussion of the severed claim against
Keene Corp., see supra note 9. If Keene Corp. was adjudicated ajoint tortfeasor,
each tortfeasor's pro rata share would be 1/10 of the actual judgment. Id.
40. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 119 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). In determining a sub-
stantive state law question, a federal court looks first to enactments of the state
legislature and to decisions of the state's highest court. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). If none exist, a federal court must apply what it finds to
be the state law after considering and giving proper regard to relevant rulings of
the state's lower courts. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465
(1967). In its determination of state law, a federal court considers all the data
available to the highest state court in light of current legal trends and policies of
13
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vides the plaintiffs with two options in the event of such a default by a
settling defendant: to sue to enforce the settlement agreement or to sue
on the underlying cause of action. 4 1 According to Judge Gibbons, the
fact that Unarco's default occurred because bankruptcy intervened was
irrelevant and, therefore, had no effect on the plaintiffs' contract
rights.42 Moreover, Judge Gibbons noted that no provision in the Bank-
ruptcy Code preempts the plaintiffs' option to disregard Unarco's
breach of the settlement agreement. 43 Rejecting the argument that
Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning would be unduly prejudiced if
the release was not applied to reduce the plaintiffs' verdict against
them,4 4 Judge Gibbons stated that Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corn-
ing would still have a cause of action against Unarco for contribution.4 5
Alternatively, Judge Gibbons emphasized that each joint tortfeasor is lia-
ble for the entire judgment without regard to its ability to collect contri-
bution from other joint tortfeasors. 4 6 Thus, Judge Gibbons maintained
that the risk of Unarco's bankruptcy should rest on the other joint
tortfeasors, not on the plaintiffs, and, therefore, should not prevent the
Roccos from recovering in full from Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh
Corning.4 7
the particular state. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967);
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). See generally C. WRIGHT,
supra note 37, § 58, at 370-77 (1983) (discussing federal court's determination of
state law).
41. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 119 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
Pennsylvania law allowing plaintiff such an option, see supra note 4 and accom-
panying text.
42. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 119 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
43. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 119-20 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons ar-
gued that § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code did not apply to the case and that even
under § 365(b)(1), a trustee could not assume an executory contract until the
default was cured, compensation paid, or adequate assurances provided. Id. (cit-
ing 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982)). For the pertinent provisions of § 365, see supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
44. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 119 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons did not
address the majority's argument that to allow the plaintiffs to rescind the release
would unduly prejudice Unarco's creditors. Id. at 119-20. For a discussion of
the majority's argument, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
45. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 119 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons ob-
served, however, that any action for contribution would be stayed under the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. It is submitted, though, that should a court elect to follow
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re
M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub. nom., Frenville Co.,
Inc. v. Avellino & Bienes, 105 S. Ct. 911 (1985), the action for contribution
would not be subject to the automatic stay. For a discussion of the potential
applicability of the automatic stay to actions for contribution, see supra note 6.
46. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 119 (Gibbons,J., dissenting); accord W. PROSSER & R.
KEETON, supra note 1, § 47, at 327 (each joint tortfeasor is liable for entire judg-
ment and plaintiff may proceed against one or all).
47. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 119 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons stated
that if Unarco's bankruptcy had occurred prior to settlement, or after a judg-
ment had been entered against Unarco, the plaintiffs would have been entitled
1282 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1269
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It is submitted that the Third Circuit in Rocco 48 was correct in con-
cluding that filing for chapter 11 is not a breach of contract authorizing
the plaintiffs to rescind their release. 49 In so holding, however, the
court disregarded an alternative analysis 50 which would have allowed
the plaintiffs to recover in full, while placing the risk of Unarco's bank-
ruptcy 5' on the nonsettlingjoint tortfeasors and still complying with the
strictures of the Bankruptcy Code. The Third Circuit's decision effec-
tively forecloses a plaintiff's recovery of one tortfeasor's share of liability
when that tortfeasor files for bankruptcy after executing a settlement
agreement. 52 By demanding immediate payment for the execution of
their releases, however, plaintiffs who enter settlement agreements can
avoid the fate of the plaintiffs in Rocco. 53
In arriving at its decision in Rocco, the Third Circuit cited no cases
in support of its conclusion that Unarco's filing of a chapter 11 petition
did not give the plaintiffs the right to rescind.5 4 Rather, the court con-
sidered only the effect of the release under section 365 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code should the release be construed as an executory contract. 55
to proceed against Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning on a theory of joint
and several liability. Id.
48. For a discussion of the facts of Rocco, see supra notes 9-25 and accompa-
nying text.
49. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116-17. For a discussion of the majority's decision
that Unarco's filing in chapter 11 was not a breach of the release, see supra notes
32-39 and accompanying text.
50. For a discussion of an alternative analysis which the Third Circuit could
have undertaken and a possible reason for their failure to do so, see infra notes
65-73 and accompanying text.
5 1. For a discussion of the allocation of risk when one joint tortfeasor files
for bankruptcy, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of the effect of a release on the plaintiff when the re-
leased joint tortfeasor files for bankruptcy, see supra notes 8, 31-32 and accom-
panying text.
53. It is possible, however, that a plaintiff who succeeds in receiving imme-
diate payment from a defendant who subsequently files for bankruptcy may,
nonetheless, risk having the payment to him avoided by a trustee in bankruptcy.
Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code empowers a trustee to avoid any preferen-
tial transfer to a creditor by a debtor on account of an antecedent debt which is
made on or within ninety days before the filing of the debtor's petition in bank-
ruptcy and which enables the creditor to receive more than he would through
the bankruptcy distribution. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. 1II 1985) (prefer-
ences). Should a settlement payment be made to a plaintiff within ninety days
prior to the defendant's filing of its bankruptcy petition, the payment, it is sub-
mitted, may be avoided by the trustee in bankruptcy.
54. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116-17. For a discussion of the court's holding that a
joint tortfeasor's filing of a bankruptcy petition is not a breach of a release au-
thorizing the plaintiff's rescission, see supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
55. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116 n.7. The Third Circuit noted that construction
of the release as an executory contract would not change its determination that
the plaintiffs did not have a right of rescission because section 365 provides that
entry into bankruptcy does not act as a breach of an executory contract. Id. For
the text of section 365, see supra note 35. For a further discussion of the opera-
tion of section 365, see infra note 57.
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While section 365 might appear dispositive of the Roccos' case, the
Third Circuit itself acknowledged that, for bankruptcy purposes, the re-
lease could not be construed as an executory contract because the Roc-
cos' claim against Unarco had been discharged.
56
It is submitted that the proper justification for the Third Circuit's
decision is to be found not in the specific language of section 365 but,
rather, should be inferred from the rationale of section 365, 5 7 the
Code's general approach to bankruptcy termination clauses, 5 8 and the
56. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116, n.7.
57. Under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor has the option of termi-
nating those unperformed executory contracts that would hamper a debtor's re-
covery. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In a chapter 11
reorganization, such an option facilitates orderly rehabilitation by enabling a
debtor to affirm only those contracts that will assist a company's attempt to once
again become viable. See, e.g., In re American National Trust, 426 F.2d 1059,
1064 (7th Cir. 1970) (if executory contract is determined to be detrimental or
onerous to corporation, its rejection should be authorized); Local Joint Execu-
tive Board v. Hotel Circle, 419 F. Supp. 778, 786-87 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (provision
of Bankruptcy Act authorizing rejection of executory contract was designed to
facilitate reorganization by relieving debtor of contractual obligations that un-
duly burden estate), aff'd, 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980).
In a chapter 11 proceeding, an executory contract or unexpired lease may
be rejected at any time before confirmation of the reorganizational plan. 11
U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Rejection by a debtor or his trustee
is subject to court approval. See, e.g., In re Parrot Packing Co., 42 Bankr. 323,
330-31 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (bankruptcy court is empowered to discharge
certain obligations, including executory contracts, in favor of debtor so that he
can function without unnecessary burdens); In re Oxford Royal Mushroom Prod-
ucts, Inc., 45 Bankr. 792, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (subject to court approval,
bankruptcy trustee may assume or reject an executory contract).
A "business judgment test" is usually employed in determining whether to
reject an executory contract. See, e.g., In re Stable Mews Associates, 41 Bankr.
594, 596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (to reject executory contract, trustee need only
satisfy "business judgment test," demonstrating that rejection will benefit the
estate); In re Condominium Ass'n of Plaza Towers South, 43 Bankr. 18, 21-22
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (to reject an executory contract or unexpired lease,
"business judgment test" requires showing that rejection will benefit the estate).
Rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease by the debtor consti-
tutes a breach of the contract or lease. 11 U.S.C. § 3 6 5(g) (1982 & Supp. III
1985). In the event an executory contract or lease is rejected, the other party to
the agreement can file a claim for any damages resulting from such rejection. 11
U.S.C. § 501(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
58. Under the Bankruptcy Act, the statute in effect immediately prior to the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, a valid and enforceable clause in a contract
or lease could provide for termination if one party filed a bankruptcy petition.
See Bankruptcy Act § 70(b), 52 Stat. 881, repealed by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). Section
70(b) of Bankruptcy Act, recognizing bankruptcy termination clauses in leases as
valid and enforceable, provided in pertinent part as follows: [A]n express cove-
nant that an assignment by operation of law or the bankruptcy of a specified
party thereto or of either party shall terminate the lease or give the other party
an election to terminate the same shall be enforceable. Bankruptcy Act at
§ 70(b); see e.g., Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300, 302 (1945) (express covenant
providing for termination of lease upon approval of reorganization petition is
valid and enforceable under the Bankruptcy Act); In re Triangle Laboratories,
1284
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663 F.2d 463, 468-69 (3d Cir. 1981) (where no compelling reason to the con-
trary, bankruptcy termination clauses should be given effect under § 70(b) of
Bankruptcy Act); In re D.H. Overmyer, Co., 383 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(affirming termination of leases on bankruptcy of lessees), aff'd, 510 F.2d 329
(2d Cir. 1975); In re Hucknall, 2 Bankr. 382 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980) (termina-
tion allowed despite extensive renovation of leased premises by debtor where
reorganization plan not capable of performance); In re Hough Mfg. Corp., 1
Bankr. 69 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1979) (termination under § 70(b) allowed where
reorganization would not be frustrated by termination).
Many courts sought to limit the applicability of these ipso facto clauses,
thereby avoiding forfeitures and allowing the processes of bankruptcy to be ef-
fectively implemented. See Weaver v. Hutson, 459 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.) (where
landlords had accepted rents of debtor after invocation of bankruptcy termina-
tion clause, clause would not be enforced where to do so would result in com-
plete emasculation of reorganization), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 957 (1972); In re
Imperial "400" National, Inc., 429 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1970) (appointment of
trustee in reorganization did not constitute breach of express covenant authoriz-
ing termination of lease on lessee's bankruptcy); In re Fleetwood Motel Corp.,
335 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964) (forfeiture provision of lease would not be enforced
in reorganization proceedings where public had invested over one-half million
dollars in debtor corporation); In re M & M Transp. Co., 437 F. Supp. 821
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (termination of lease would preclude successful rehabilitation of
company); In re Delta Motor Hotel, 10 Bankr. 585 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1981) (for-
feiture would deprive debtor of primary asset required for reorganization); see
also 2 L. COLLIER, COLLIER'S BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 363.07 (3d ed. 1985); Fogel,
Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in the Bankruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 341
(1980). The current Bankruptcy Code, although not declaring such clauses
void, provides that they are not enforceable while the bankruptcy case is open,
thus indicating the Code's general disinclination to enforce bankruptcy termina-
tion clauses and to allow a party to renounce his contract upon the other con-
tracting party's entry into bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1982); see also
H. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6304. The legislative history to section 365(e) explains that
this subsection does not limit the application of an ipso facto or bank-
ruptcy clause to a new insolvency or receivership after the bankruptcy
case is closed. That is, the clause is not invalidated in toto, but merely
made inapplicable during the case for the purposes of disporition [sic]
of the executory contract or unexpired lease.
Id. at 6305. Such a clause would, therefore, be enforceable in the event of a
subsequent insolvency case or receivership after the bankruptcy or reorganiza-
tion case has been closed. See H. MILLER & M. COOK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT 172.9 (Supp. 1984); see also 2 L. COLLIER, supra,
363.07.
The Code's disinclination to enforce bankruptcy termination clauses is fur-
ther illustrated in section 363(1) which authorizes a trustee to use, sell, or lease
property of a bankrupt regardless of a contract provision which purports to ef-
fect a forfeiture of such property by a bankrupt on the commencement of bank-
ruptcy proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 363(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section
541 (c)(1)(B) further states that an interest of the debtor becomes property of the
estate notwithstanding any provision
that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the
debtor, on the commencement of a case under this title, or on the ap-
pointment of or the taking possession by a trustee in a case under this
title or a custodian before such commencement, and that effects or
gives an option to effect a forefeiture, modification, or termination of
the debtor's interest in property.
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1985). Section 365 additionally provides
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policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code itself.5 9 While no provision of
the Bankruptcy Code explicitly states that entry into bankruptcy is not a
breach of contract, 60 to allow a plaintiff to rescind a contract with a de-
fendant solely on the basis of a chapter 11 filing would undermine the
purpose of chapter 11: the successful rehabilitation of a bankrupt corpo-
ration through reorganization. 6 1
Thus, given the Bankruptcy Code's tendency to disfavor termina-
tions of contracts on commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, 6 2 it is
submitted that the Third Circuit was correct in holding that the rule
allowing a plaintiff to ignore a breached settlement agreement and to
proceed against nonsettling defendants 63 is inapplicable when the sole
reason for the alleged breach is the filing of a chapter 11 reorganization
petition. 6 4 It is suggested, however, that the Third Circuit's analysis
should have addressed the possibility that a breach of the release had
that commencement of a chapter 11 reorganization itself is not a breach of an
executory contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For the text
of section 365(b)(2), see supra note 35. It is submitted that these provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code recognize that it is often to the benefit of the debtor to
maintain certain contractual relationships without having such relationships ter-
minated on bankruptcy. See 2 L. COLLIER, supra, 365.02[1]; see also S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5787, 5845. In explaining the Code's reluctance to enforce bankruptcy termina-
tion clauses, the legislative history to section 365(e) states:
These [bankruptcy termination] clauses, protected under present law,
automatically terminate the contract or lease, or permit the other con-
tracting party to terminate the contract or lease in the event of bank-
ruptcy. This frequently hampers rehabilitation efforts. If the trustee may
assume or assign the contract ... the contract or lease may be utilized
to assist in the debtor's rehabilitation....
Id. (emphasis added).
59. For a discussion of the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code and
chapter 11 in particular, see supra notes 5 & 15.
60. It is noted, however, that the Supreme Court has held that the initiation
of bankruptcy proceedings is an anticipatory breach of an executory contract
constituting the basis for a provable claim. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Ir-
ving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433 (1937). Such a rule was adopted not as a logical
consequence of the doctrine of anticipatory breach, but as a policy decision to
facilitate allowance of unmatured claims in bankruptcy proceedings. J.
CALAMARI ANDJ. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 12-8, at 463. Since the amended Bank-
ruptcy Code explicitly allows unmatured claims, it is questionable whether the
Supreme Court today would follow this holding. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982)
(claim is right to payment whether or not such right is unmatured). Moreover,
the specific language of section 365 mandates that filing in bankruptcy is not a
breach of an executory contract. For the pertinent provision of section 365, see
supra note 35.
61. For a discussion of the purpose behind chapter 11, see supra note 15.
62. For a discussion of the Code's tendency to disfavor termination of con-
tracts on the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, see supra note 58.
63. For a discussion of Pennsylvania law concerning a plaintiff's options
upon the settling defendant's default on a settlement agreement, see supra note
4.
64. For a discussion of the majority's decision preventing plaintiffs who ex-
ecute a release in favor of a defendant who later files for bankruptcy from pro-
1286 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1269
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occurred by reason of Unarco's failure to pay the Roccos the agreed
settlement prior to its filing for reorganization. 65 It is thus submitted
that while the Third Circuit was correct in its decision to treat the Roc-
cos as ordinary creditors on the basis of their allegation of Unarco's
bankruptcy as breach, such a decision cannot be justified if the Roccos
had established a legitimate ground under state law to rescind their re-
lease prior to Unarco's bankruptcy. 66
The Third Circuit either did not know or did not disclose the nature
of the settlement agreement between the Roccos and Unarco. 6 7 It is
suggested that the settlement agreement may have been breached
before Unarco filed for reorganization. If the release was contingent
upon Unarco's payment of the agreed consideration, 6 8 Unarco's failure
to pay would have constituted a material breach of the release, 69 giving
ceeding against nonsettling joint tortfeasors, see supra notes 31-39 and
accompanying text.
65. The majority opinion indicated that if the Roccos had asserted breach
of contract for nonpayment of the agreed settlement before Unarco filed for
reorganization they would have been entitled to proceed against Johns-Manville
and Pittsburgh Corning for Unarco's pro rata share, without reduction being
made under the Joint Tortfeasors Act for Unarco's release. See Rocco, 754 F.2d
at 116. The majority stated that the plaintiffs' argument that they should be
entitled to disregard the release "is not applicable here where plaintiffs have not
argued that the breach occurred before the chapter 11 petition was filed .. " Id.
(emphasis added). The plaintiffs' error, in the majority's opinion, was their fail-
ure to assert a breach of the settlement agreement before Unarco filed its chap-
ter 11 petition. See id. The majority, however, did not address the possibility of
nonpayment before bankruptcy as breach. Id. at 116-17.
66. For a discussion of possible justification for plaintiffs' rescission of the
release given to Unarco, see infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
67. Rocco, 754 F.2d at 116-17. The Third Circuit's decision quoted no lan-
guage from Unarco's release. Id. The only language quoted by the Third Cir-
cuit was from releases given by the Roccos to other settling defendants with
regard to reduction of the plaintiffs' judgment on the adjudication of these de-
fendants as joint tortfeasors. Id. at 115 n.6.
68. It is submitted that releases, as executed transactions, are necessarily
conditional in nature: what the plaintiff bargains for in discharging the settling
defendant is immediate compensation for his injury, rather than a promise by
the settling defendant to pay in the future. Thus the discharge effected by the
release is conditional on payment. SeeJ. MURRAY, supra note 4, at 526 (release, as
an executed transaction is not promissory in character).
69. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 274, 397 (1969). To determine
whether one party's failure to perform is a material breach of contract, the origi-
nal Restatement of Contracts indicated that if the failure of one party to perform or
his delay in performing was so material that it would result in the other party's
not receiving substantially what he bargained for, the duty of the injured party
would be discharged and he would be wholly excused from carrying out his un-
dertaking. See id. § 274 (failure of consideration as discharge of duty), § 397
(material breach or non-performance of one party as discharge of duty of other).
The current Restatement emphasizes that a material failure to perform operates as
the nonoccurrence of a condition that may either temporarily prevent the activa-
tion of the other party's duty to perform or, when the condition can no longer
occur, discharge the duty entirely. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 237 (1979) (effiect on other party's duties of failure to render performance).
19
DeMarco: Torts - Joint Tortfeasors - Release in Favor of Joint Tortfeasor
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the Roccos the option, before bankruptcy was actually initiated, of pro-
ceeding against Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning for Unarco's pro
rata share. 70 With the release already rescinded because of Unarco's
breach, Unarco's subsequent filing for bankruptcy would have had no
effect on the plaintiffs' rights against the other joint tortfeasors. 7 1 The
Roccos, thus, would have been entitled to proceed against Johns-
Manville and Pittsburgh Corning as joint tortfeasors to recover Unarco's
pro rata share, and no reduction in the judgment would be made under
the Joint Tortfeasors Act as a result of the release. 72
Proceeding on the basis that filing for reorganization is not a breach
of contract, the Third Circuit did not undertake this alternative analy-
sis. 7 3 The court's decision in Rocco, therefore, while legally correct
under the Bankruptcy Code, denies the plaintiffs their possible rightful
recovery against Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning under the
Pennsylvania Joint Tortfeasors Act.' 4 In placing the risk of Unarco's
bankruptcy on the plaintiffs rather than the defendants, Johns-Manville
and Pittsburgh Corning, the Third Circuit has reached a result that is
more equitable among tortfeasors than fair to the injured plaintiff.7 5
The current Restatement also indicates certain circumstances that are significant
in determining whether a breach is material:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the
benefit which he reasonably expected;(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately com-
pensated for the part of the benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will suffer forfeiture;(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances
including any reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to per-
form or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and
fair dealing.
Id. § 241; see alsoJ. MURRAY, supra note 4, § 167, at 322 (comparing the original
and current Restatement's approach to material breach).
70. For a discussion of a plaintiff's ability in Pennsylvania to disregard a
breached settlement, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of a plaintiff's ability to proceed against one or all joint
tortfeasors, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
72. For a discussion of the reduction in the plaintiffs' judgment under the
Joint Tortfeasors Act, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
73. It is submitted that the Third Circuit's failure to consider this alterna-
tive contract law analysis may be attributed either to the failure of the plaintiffs'
attorney to fully raise the argument or to the Third Circuit's dissatisfaction with
the plaintiffs' failure to promptly contest the validity of the release in bankruptcy
court. For a discussion of the majority's dissatisfaction with the plaintiffs' failure
to timely contest the validity of the release, see supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
74. For a discussion of the plaintiffs' ability to recover against Johns-
Manville and Pittsburgh Corning for Unarco's pro rata share, see supra note 26-
39 and accompanying text.
75. As a result of the Third Circuit's decision, Johns-Manville and Pitts-
burgh Corning are entitled to a reduction of the judgment against them to the
1288 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1269
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Given the Third Circuit's decision in Rocco, plaintiffs should execute re-
leases only in exchange for immediate payment of the agreed considera-
tion at the time of settlement. 76 Otherwise, plaintiffs risk having to seek
payment from a bankrupt.
Lisa A. DeMarco
extent of Unarco's pro rata share, thus avoiding a contribution claim by Johns-
Manville and Pittsburgh Corning against Unarco. See Rocco, 754 F.2d at 117.
For a discussion of Johns-Manville's and Pittsburgh Corning's ability to seek
contribution from Unarco, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, have received no compensation from
Unarco for the execution of the release in its favor and must face the prospect of
recovering, through Unarco's plan of reorganization, an amount less than that
agreed on in the release. For a discussion of the plaintiffs' recovery as an un-
secured creditor, see supra note 15.
76. As noted previously, a plaintiff may still risk having a settlement pay-
ment avoided as a preference by a trustee in bankruptcy. For a discussion of the
ability of a trustee to avoid certain transfers of a debtor, see supra note 53.
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